Security: protected link, identification, reporting
Security targets the malicious act of a third party, where safety targets failure and error. That distinction is what justifies a whole subject in the examination, and it can be read in very concrete requirements of the Delegated Regulation.
Key points
- Parts 3 (point 8) and 4 (point 12) of the Annex to the Delegated Regulation require a command and control link protected against unauthorised access to the command and control functions, except for tethered aircraft.
- That requirement closes a door, it does not open an official one: no provision provides for the authority to take over control of the aircraft.
- The direct remote identification system must reduce the ability of tampering with its functionality (Annex, Parts 2, 3 and 4), and point UAS.OPEN.060(1)(d) makes the remote pilot check before the flight that it is active and up to date. Disabling it is not a setting, it is a breach.
- The words ‘up to date’ are decisive: a system switched on but carrying an obsolete registration number, after a change of operator for instance, does not meet the requirement.
- Part 2, point 12(a) provides that the system performs a consistency check on the full string provided to the operator at the time of registration and emits an error message in case of inconsistency. That message flags a mistyped number, not a fault in the aircraft.
- Point UAS.OPEN.050(2) requires the operator to make efficient use of the radio spectrum in order to avoid harmful interference. The obligation runs both ways: not suffering interference that would cost you the link, and not causing it to others.
- Reporting stays with the operator: Article 19(2) requires safety-related occurrences to be reported to the competent authority, in compliance with Regulation (EU) No 376/2014.
The trap. Seeing remote identification as an optional tracker is the reasoning error of this subject. It is the mechanism that makes it possible, from the ground, to link an aircraft to an operator: it is precisely that link which protects remote pilots who play by the rules.
Source
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 (CELEX 02019R0945, consolidated on 24/06/2025), Annex, Part 2, point 12, Part 3, point 8, and Part 4, point 12; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 (CELEX 02019R0947, consolidated on 01/05/2025), art. 19, paragraph 2, and Annex Part A, points UAS.OPEN.050(2) and UAS.OPEN.060(1)(d); Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 (CELEX 02014R0376, consolidated on 11/09/2018)